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A New Jersey court' has considered an issue not yet addressed by a Texas
appellate court: What constitutes a woman for purposes of marriage? In a
dispute arising in the licensing process the court held that a transsexual male
may enter into a valid marriage. As enacted in 1969, section 1.01 of the Family
Code 2 provided that "persons" intending to enter into a formal marriage
acquire a license to marry. The ensuing discussion of the modes of marriage3
caused the legislature, out of an abundance of caution, to substitute the
phrase "a man and a woman" for "persons," although the attorney general of
Texas had already expressed the view that "marriage" connoted a bisexual
union.4 The Texas informal marriage statute5 contains provisions similar to
those found in section 1.01.
In establishing an informal marriage, proof that the couple held themselves
out to the public as married is often the easiest element to prove through the
testimony of third persons. The best evidence in such a circumstance will
generally come from those persons who would be most likely apprised of the
relationship: the couple's families, close friends, and associates. In Till v.
Till6 there was testimony from such persons that supported conflicting
conclusions. The couple had evidently made representations of being married
to the man's relatives and his employer, but the woman's relatives were
merely told that the couple were going to be married. The couple's own
testimony also conflicted with respect to their agreement to marry. On the
basis of all of the evidence the trial court concluded that there was an informal
marriage, and the appellate court found sufficient evidence in the record to
support this conclusion.
Section 1.91(b) 7 provides that if cohabitation as husband and wife and
holding out as husband and wife are proved, an agreement of the couple to be
married may be inferred. This section must mean that the court may infer that
fact in the absence of evidence on the matter. If either party to the alleged
* B.A., The University of Texas; B.C.L., M.A., Oxford University; LL.M., Columbia
University. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
2. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.01 (Vernon 1975). Pennsylvania law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, §
1-5(h) (Purdon 1965), provides that a married person "guilty of adultery," may not be granted a
license to marry the correspondent during the lifetime of the ex-spouse. A request for a
three-judge federal court to test the constitutionality of the statute was denied on the ground that
a state court would have to determine whether the statute meant criminally guilty of adultery or
merely the commission of an act of adultery. Chlystek v. Kane, 412 F. Supp. 20 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
At any rate, the court went on to observe that the couple who sought to attack the statute might
circumvent any impediment posed by the statute by entering into an informal marriage.
3. See McKnight, Commentary to the Texas Family Code, Title 1, 5 TEX. TECH L. REV. 281
(1974).
4. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. M-1216 (1972).
5. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.91(a) (Vernon 1975).
6. 539 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ).
7. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.91(b) (Vernon 1975).
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marriage testifies to an agreement to marry, the court is not entertaining an
inference but is merely making its finding on the basis of the evidence
adduced.8 If all the evidence offered as to an agreement tends to disprove its
existence, there is no room to infer it. In Durr v. Newman9 a couple had
initially agreed to be married, cohabitated, and held themselves out as
husband and wife. But during all this time one of them was still married to
someone else. After the impediment was removed, they continued to cohabit
and hold themselves out as husband and wife but outside Texas. No new
agreement was proved. In this instance the court held that no new agreement
was necessary, and recourse to section 1.91(b) was unnecessary. Section
2.22,1 which deals with the effects of removal of an impediment, simply
validates the subsisting invalid union. In this instance the couple entered into
the initial relationship which would have constituted an informal marriage but
for the impediment. Their only cohabitation and holding out as a married
couple after the removal of the impediment occurred after they had ceased to
be residents of Texas although presumably still domiciled there. The court
concluded that the provisions of section 2.22 do not require that all of the facts
supporting its application occur within Texas.'
The appellate courts have recently twice rejected the argument that the law
of the place of marriage in force at the time of marriage provides an implied
term of the marriage. In each instance 2 it was asserted that the existing
grounds for divorce, mainly fault grounds now amplified with a no-fault
ground, were implicitly accepted at the inception of the marriage as the only
means by which it might be dissolved. Section 4.0113 of the Family Code and
its predecessor enacted in 184014 have long provided that marriages entered
into in other states are subject to the law of Texas. The provision was initially
designed to insure the applicability of the Texas matrimonial property re-
quirement implied as a term of the marriage from the lex loci contractus."
8. A confusion of these two situations is indicated in the court's opinion in Reilly v. Jacobs,
536 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
9. 537 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
10. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.22 (Vernon 1975):
Marriage During Existence of Prior Marriage. A marriage is void if either party
was previously married and the prior marriage is not dissolved. However, the
marriage becomes valid when the prior marriage is dissolved if since that time the
parties have lived together as husband and wife and represented themselves to
others as being married.
11. Since there was no proof of foreign law, it was presumed to be the same as Texas law.
The appellate court properly refused to remand for proof of foreign law. Under the more prosaic
intrastate facts of Talbert v. Talbert, I Tex. Ct. Rep. 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976), the
court also considered the effects of removal of an impediment to an informal marriage.
For a situation involving a property dispute growing out of a meretricious relationship see
Simon v. Watson, 539 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ). See also Marvin v.
Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976); Clark, The New Ma rriage, 12 WILLAMETrE L.J.
441 (1976); Folberg & Buren, Domestic Partnership: A Proposal for Dividing the Property of
Unmarried Families, 12 WILLAMETrE L.J. 453 (1976).
12. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 540 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ);
Smitheal v. Smitheal, 518 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ dism'd).
13. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.01 (Vernon 1975).
14. Tex. Laws 1840, An Act to adopt the Common Law of England,-to repeal certain
Mexican Laws, and to regulate the Marital Rights of parties § 13, at 6, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF
TEXAS 180 (1898).
15. See Thomas & Thomas, Community Property and the Conflict of Laws: A Recapitula-
tion, 4 Sw. L.J. 46, 52-57 (1950).
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As recently as two years ago' 6 it could not be said with any certainty what
rights a husband has to interfere with his wife's medical treatment for
termination of pregnancy. Now the Supreme Court of the United States has
determined that imposition of a prerequisite of spousal consent to abortion in
the first twleve weeks of pregnancy is unconstitutional. 7 The states cannot
prescribe the husband's consent to a matter in which the state itself cannot
interfere. Nor is it permissible for the state to prescribe that such abortions be
performed in a hospital or licensed health facility.' 8
Several non-Texas cases further explained and developed the law with
respect to interspousal interception of communications during marriage and
in anticipation of divorce. In 1975 in Simpson v. Simpson 19 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals denied damages for the gathering and use in a divorce
proceeding of evidence procured by the husband by means of a telephone tap
of his wife's conversation. In the Eighth Circuit court,20 however, recovery
was allowed against third persons in a spouse's employ for procuring informa-
tion by the use of listening devices. The North Carolina Supreme Court2'
suppressed interspousal wiretapped evidence in a divorce proceeding on the
basis of the federal statutory prohibitions. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit 22 nonetheless refused to dismiss an indictment of a husband for
intercepting telephone conversations of his estranged wife, while the Federal
District Court for the Northern District of Texas 23 declined to elevate the
evidentiary marital privilege to a constitutional right in a situation where both
spouses were charged with a criminal offense.
For the purpose of satisfying the requirement of ninety days' residence in a
county for the bringing of a suit for divorce there, 24 it has long been disputed
how much evidence is needed to show an actual move to establish a new
residence. 25 In Beavers v. Beavers26 the wife sought to show establishment of
a new residence in a different county by paying part of the rent for a friend's
apartment there, but she did so without advising anyone of her "movee"
except some of her creditors, one of whom sent bills to the new address. She
returned to her original residence every evening and spent nights there until
she separated from her husband. At that time she moved her effects to the
second county but to a place other than her friend's apartment. The appellate
court was not convinced that a change of residence had been accomplished. 27
16. McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 69 (1975).
17. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831, 49 L. Ed. 2d 788 (1976).
18. Arnold v. Sendak, 416 F. Supp. 22 (S.D. Ind.), aff'd without opinion, 97 S. Ct. 476,
(1976).
19. 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974).
20. White v. Weiss, 535 F.2d 1067 (8th Cir. 1976). See also Remington v. Remington, 393 F.
Supp. 898 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
21. Rickenbaker v. Rickenbaker, 290 N.C. 373, 226 S.E.2d 347 (1976).
22. United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976).
23. United States v. Hicks, 420 F. Supp. 533 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
24. TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 3.21 (Vernon 1975).
25. Wilson v. Wilson, 494 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, writ
dism'd); Meyer v. Meyer, 361 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1962, writ dism'd); Ther-
wanger v. Therwanger, 175 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1943, no writ).
26. 543 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ).
27. Garza v. Trevino, 541 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ),
involved satisfaction of residence requirements for purposes of TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. art.
5.08(&) (Vernon Suppl. 1976-77).
.
An opponent alleged that a husband-candidate had not been a
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The appellate courts have twice stated28 that the proper means of challenging
residence requirements for divorce is by a plea in abatement, not by a plea of
privilege.
In re Parr29 involved two suits for divorce brought in quick succession by
the spouses in different counties. The wife filed for divorce in county A, and
the husband filed thereafter in county B where the wife filed her plea in
abatement alleging the prior suit in county A. The wife's plea in abatement
was denied in county B, and, as a result, the court in county A refused to
proceed. This conclusion of the court of county A was sustained by the
Corpus Christi court of civil appeals on the ground that dominant jurisdiction
had been acquired in the matter by the court in county B. In Raney v. Raney 30
it was argued that a pending suit for divorce and child support required
dismissal of a subsequent Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
(URESA) proceeding (involving the same parties) commenced in another
state and transferred to this state. 3' It was concluded that URESA creates an
exception to the rule of dominant jurisdiction as enunciated in Curtis v.
Gibbs .32
To obtain a continuance for his missing client an attorney must show why
his client will be prejudiced by nonappearance, give a reasonable explanation
for his absence, show that he has not been delinquent in locating his client,
and demonstrate why the client has not been deposed if his testimony is
essential. 33 Unless an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge is
shown, an appellate court will not disturb the ruling below in refusing a
continuance. 34 In Bond v. Bond35 two weeks' continuance was sought under
the Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act within twenty days of the client's military
retirement.36 In this instance the burden was upon the other party to show that
the soldier was not imposed upon by defending the suit, and the court
therefore abused its discretion in the absence of such a showing.
A divorce court is loath to employ receivership as a means of collecting or
protecting assets. 37 In Couch Mortgage Co. v. Hughes38 the court enunciated
the further proposition that a divorce court cannot appoint a receiver of
corporate property in the absence of a showing that the corporation is the alter
resident of the county for six months as the statute required because his wife lived in another
county. The husband was employed in the county of election but spent days-off and vacations
with his wife who often spent weekends with her husband in the county of election. The court
held that the husband's residence requirements were satisfied.
28. Harrison v. Harrison, 543 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no
writ); Lutes v. Lutes, 538 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ).
29. 543 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ).
30. 536 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ).
31. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 21.01-.66 (Vernon 1975).
32. 511 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. 1974).
33. Ray v. Ray, 542 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ).
34. Chandler v. Chandler, 536 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ
dism'd). In this instance a second continuance had been sought under circumstances evidently
causing the trial court to feel that enough delay had been allowed and the movant had had
sufficient notice of the second setting.
35. 2 Tex. Ct. Rep. 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, no writ).
36. 50 U.S.C. § 521 (1970).
37. In H & R Oils, Inc. v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 541 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1976, no writ), the court in a non-divorce case said that an applicant for receivership must
have an interest in property the receiver is to take.
38. 536 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ).
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ego of a party. In First Southern Properties, Inc. v. Vallone39 a receiver had
been appointed in a divorce proceeding and had taken charge of real property
held in the husband's name but subject to a deed of trust with a power of sale
in the trustee in case of the husband's default. The receiver did not record lis
pendens. The trustee's lien was foreclosed, and the purchaser at the sale
bought without notice of the receivership. The receiver then moved to set
aside the sale. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the property was in
custodia legis, and the lis pendens statute was, therefore, inapplicable. The
court nonetheless recommended that the legislature require lis pendens filing
in this instance to protect purchasers. 40 In its effort to protect the careless
receiver the court reached a conclusion that seems dubious at best. The
principal authority relied upon was a case decided in 1891, long before the
passage of the lis pendens statute in 1905.
Putting aside judicial interpretations, the legislature is now faced with
finding a proper solution of the problem. A simple solution would be enact-
ment of an amendment to article 664041 by which receivers are specifically
required to file lis pendens in these instances in order to be protected against
bona fide purchasers. The Bankruptcy Act 42 already requires bankrupcy
trustees to record the bankrupt's interest in property subject to foreclosure so
that purchasers are protected.
In First Southern Properties, Inc. v. Gregory43 it was argued that mere
pendency of a divorce proceeding requires a purchaser of property subject to
court order, but not in custodia legis, to apprise himself of any restraints or
conditions imposed by the divorce court with respect to the disposition of
property at his peril and regardless of silence of the lis pendens record. In
Fannin Bank v. Blystone 4 the Waco court of civil appeals left the misleading
impression, which remained uncorrected by the supreme court in finding
other grounds for supporting the result reached, that compliance with the lis
pendens statute45 is not required with respect to community property subject
to an order restraining its disposition pending divorce under section 3.5846 of
the Family Code. In effect the Waco court, relying on authorities prior to the
passage of the lis pendens statute in 1905, held that a divorce proceeding
involving disposition of particular realty is notice to anyone dealing with the
spouse who holds record title to the property. Such a rule would put an
intolerable burden on prospective purchasers who are not put on notice by the
lis pendens record. This conclusion was, therefore, rejected by the Houston
(First District) court in First Southern Properties, Inc. v. Gregory in its
39. 533 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1976).
40. Since the court said the purchaser was entitled to get his money back, the principle of
caveat emptor would evidently be inapplicable to a situation in which the purchaser refused to
pay the trustee on realizing that the trustee could not give good title.
41. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6640 (Vernon 1969).
42. Bankruptcy Act § 21(g), II U.S.C. § 44 (1970).
43. 538 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ).
44. 417 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1967), writ ref'd n.r.e., 424 S.W.2d 626 (Tex.
1968), discussed in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J.
129, 138-39 (1968), relied on by the court in First S. Properties, Inc. v. Gregory, 538 S.W.2d 454,
458 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ).
45. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6640 (Vernon 1969).
46. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.58 (Vernon 1975). See also id. § 3.57.
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application to separate property which the owner-spouse had been enjoined
from selling pending his divorce.4 7
The legislature has provided 48 for the use of special masters in Dallas
County, but elsewhere they may be properly employed in extraordinary
circumstances only. 49 In spite of persistent reminders from the appellate
courts50 attorneys continue to overlook the requirement of a bond51 with
respect to enjoining third parties in divorce proceedings. All too frequently
divorce cases reach the appellate level without any findings or statements of
fact so that the appellate court has, in effect, nothing to review with respect to
the facts found.5 2 In 1975 article 232453 was amended to provide that court
reporters would be available "on request." Hence, if no reporter is re-
quested, the right to the question-and-answer record which might have been
made is waived.5 4 But a defaulting party without fault in not obtaining a record
is still entitled to a statement of facts. 5
The Beaumont court has ruled 56 that a judgment fixing permanent child
support and terminating temporary alimony and child support is final when
rendered even though the court's order may be entered at a much later date.
This conclusion is consistent with that of the supreme court57 with respect to
the finality of judgments for divorce when, after rendition of divorce but
before entry of the order, a party to the proceeding dies. If a party dies prior to
judgment, however, the proceeding must be terminated.5 1
47. In Neel v. Fuller, 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 120 (Dec. 12, 1976), the Texas Supreme Court held
that an interest in property held in receivership may not be disposed of by the owner without prior
approval by the court. The propriety of a receiver's management of property is not subject to a
jury's fact-finding since receivership is wholly within the court's discretionary powers. Moody v.
State, 538 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ).
48. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-9b.2 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
49. Tex. R. Civ. P. 171; Bell v. Bell, 540 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.]
1976, no writ); TEX. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-609 (1975).
50. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Hopkins, 539 S.W.2d 242, 246-47 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1976, no writ).
51. TEX. R. Civ. P. 693a.
52. See Scoggins v. Scoggins, 531 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, no writ). With
respect to various procedural factors in the fact-finding process in jury trials in particular see
Boriack v. Boriack, 541 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ dism'd);
Williams v. Williams, 537 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler, no writ); Spiller v. Spiller, 535
S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ dism'd); Goetz v. Goetz, 534 S.W.2d 716 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
53. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2324 (Vernon 1971).
54. See Bledsoe v. Black, 535 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, no writ).
55. Smith v. Smith, 544 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. 1976); Brown v. Brown, 520 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ); Dugie v. Dugie, 511 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1974, no writ).
56. Leone v. Leone, 543 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ). The court
was at pains to distinguish Exparte Gnesoulis, 525 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1975, no writ), though as indicated in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 74 (1976), the cases are similar since in each instance there was reliance on a
letter from the court which recorded the court's oral judgment. The earlier case is different in that
it is a contempt proceeding turning on the lack of a written order to support that stern
consequence of disobedience. Though the opinion in Leone, supra, at 681, is somewhat garbled,
the record in that case appears to have been somewhat fuller then that in Gnesoulis.
Ex parte Wagley, 530 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ),
illustrates the point that a motion for contempt cannot be grounded on disobedience of provisions
of a judgment which constitutes a material alteration added more than 30 days after entry of the
final order.
57. Dunn v. Dunn, 439 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. 1969). For another situation involving death of a
party see Deen v. Deen, 530 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ), discussed in
McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 72-73 (1976).
58. Parr v. White, 543 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ); Parr v.
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By way of obiter dictum in McCartney v. Mead59 the court said that
pledging an interest awarded by the divorce court as collateral for a loan to
bear the cost of appeal does not bar an appeal under the rule that voluntary
acceptance of a benefit of judgment precludes appeal' with respect to
division of property. After entry of the divorce decree the wife moved for
waiver of costs for appeal supported by her affidavit stating her inability to
pay. The trial court refused to waive costs and the wife sought a writ of
mandamus to force the court to do so. 61 The appellate court held that to be
entitled to a writ of mandamus in such an instance the record must show that
the petitioner made an unsuccessful attempt to borrow the funds necessary to
pay for the appeal bond since the trial court had found that the estate of the
parties was substantial enough to pay any costs which might be adjudged
against the petitioner. 62
II. CHARACTERIZATION
Frey v. Estate of Sargent63 involved a contract between proposed spouses
entered into prior to the amendment of article 4610' (now section 5.4165) in
1967. The agreement was executed in Oklahoma but was intended to be
performed in Texas, and, hence, Texas law was treated as governing its
operation. The prospective spouses agreed that the husband would bequeath
$30,000 to the wife, who would, in turn, minister to the needs of the
husband.66 The husband executed a will providing for the contracted bequest
but revoked it after his wife predeceased him. The wife's heirs asserted their
entitlement to the benefits of the contract. The court rejected this contention
on the ground that the contract was one of "a personal nature" which did not
evidence an intention of the contracting parties that the agreed bequest should
benefit the wife's heirs under the circumstances which occurred. In the
opening paragraph of its opinion the court commented, almost as an aside,
that the contract expressed "an order of descent of Texas property contrary
to the existing provisions of. . . art. 4610."67 The court's allusion was to the
White, 543 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ); Pritchard v. Estate of
Tuttle, 534 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ).
59. 541 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ).
60. Roye v. Roye, 531 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, no writ); Trader v. Trader,
531 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no writ).
61. In the meantime the wife was able to procure some funds to file an appeal bond. The
appellate court held that her doing so in this instance did not moot the question of her right to
litigate the question of waiver of costs of appeal.
In Harrison v. Harrison, 543 S.W.2d 176(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ),
the court held that the appellant's failure to give notice of appeal under TEX. R. Civ. P. 354(b) is
not jurisdictional as to the appeal, but in some circumstances failure to give notice may cause an
appellate court to deny an appeal.
62. A non-injunctive temporary order is, of course, not appealable. Wells v. Wells, 539
S.W.2d 220 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1976, writ dism'd). The court also pointed out
that TEX. R. Civ. P. 683 had been sufficiently complied with by a general recital of need for
preservation of the parties' rights.
63. 533 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
64. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4610 (Vernon 1925) as originally enacted in Tex. Laws
1840, An Act to adopt the Common Law of England,-to repeal certain Mexican Laws, and to
regulate the Marital Rights of parties § 5, at 5, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 179 (1898).
65. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.41 (Vernon 1975).
66. If the proposed wife's promise was merely to do that which a faithful wife is bound to do
anyway, the contract is still supportable as made in consideration of marriage.
67. 533 S.W.2d at 143.
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now-repealed, and often misconstrued, provision of the statute that marriage
contracts should not "alter the order of descent." The origin and meaning of
this phrase were long unappreciated and the phrase was, therefore, misinter-
preted68 as a condemnation of any term of such a contract which would cause
property to devolve otherwise than as provided by the statute of descent and
distribution.
Modern research demonstrates that the statute was adapted from the
Louisiana Code of 182569 which used almost identical phraseology and
referred to compliance with the principle of forced heirship, then applicable
in both Louisiana7 ° and Texas.7' The Texas forced heirship rule was repealed
in 1856, but this vestige of the rule lingered on as a kind of disembodied spirit
until the amendment of article 4610 in 1967.72 The Amarillo court of civil
appeals wisely avoided further comment on old article 4610 in arriving at its
decision. As the Supreme Court of Texas pointed out in Valmont Plantations
v. Texas, 73 subsequent historical research may be used to correct prior
misconceptions.
The subject matter of a gift in trust has long perplexed the courts. For
example, if a spouse is the beneficiary of a trust, is the subject of the gift
merely the equitable estate held in trust or does it also include the income by
which that beneficial interest is valued? There is no other means of measuring
the beneficiary's interest in corpus than by its production of income. Hence,
it is asserted that the right to receive income is really the subject matter of the
gift. On three occasions the Supreme Court of Texas has stated that the settlor
of a trust or the donor of other inter vivos gifts may provide that income from
the property shall be the separate property of the donee. 74 Several old federal
court tax cases have reached the conclusion that in the absence of such
directions trust income is community property. 75 But the courts have consis-
68. See, e.g., Burton v. Bell, 380 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1964).
69. 1825 La. Acts art. 2306 (current version at LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2326 (West 1973)).
70. 1825 La. Acts arts. 1480, 1482 (current version at LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts 1493, 1495
(West 1973)).
71. See Tex. Laws 1840, An Act Concerning Wills §§ 13, 15, at 170, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF
TEXAS 344 (1898), repealed, Tex. Laws 1856, ch. 85, § 1, at 5, 4 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 423
(1898). See also Tex. Laws 1837, An Act Authorizing persons to dispose of property by Will § 1, at
106, 1 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1448 (1898).
72. Another remnant of the same idea lingers on in TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon
1975): "In a decree of divorce or annulment the court shall order a division of the estate of the
parties in a manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each
party and any children of the marriage." This language had its origins in the Divorce Act of 1841.
Tex. Laws 1841, An Act Concerning Divorce and Alimony § 13, at 22, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF
TEXAS 486 (1898). In spite of its lack of meaning in the law's historical context, its seeming
relevance to the process of division of marital property on divorce was employed in McKnight v.
McKnight, 535 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso), rev'd on other grounds, 543 S.W.2d 863
(Tex. 1976).
73. 163 Tex. 381, 383, 355 S.W.2d 502,503 (1962), relying on Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43
U.S. (2 How.) 127, 196-97 (1844).
74. Strickland v. Wester, 131 Tex. 23, 112 S.W.2d 1047 (1938) (dictum in case involving
non-trust gift by husband to wife); Cauble v. Beaver-Electra Ref. Co., 115 Tex. 1,274 S.W. 120
(1925) (dictum in case not involving gifts between husband and wife); Hutchison v. Mitchell, 39
Tex. 488 (1873) (gift in trust by husband for wife providing that income should be her separate
property). Lower court decisions have reached the same conclusion. Sullivan v. Skinner, 66 S.W.
680 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902, writ ref'd); McClelland v. McClelland, 37 S.W. 350 (Tex. Civ. App.
1896, writ ref'd); Monday v. Vance, 32 S.W. 559 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895, no writ); Shepflin v.
Small, 23 S.W. 432 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893, no writ).
75. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Porter, 148 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1945); Commissioner v. Terry,
69 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1934).
[Vol. 31
FAMILY LAW: HUSBAND AND WIFE
tently held that income of a discretionary trust which is not paid the be-
neficiary is not community property.76 Hence, if the settlor directs that such
income be added to the trust corpus, it follows, as the Texarkana court held in
In re Marriage of Long,7 7 that such additions constitute separate property of
the beneficiary who, as a distinct and separate right, may also be the donee of
the corpus.
On dissolution of a marriage a claimant who asserts that particular property
is separate property rather than community property may trace its acquisition
to a mutation of a demonstrably separate asset. When tracing or other means
of iroving separate character of the property fails, 8 the presumption of
community character prevails. 79 If separate funds in a definite amount are
deposited in a bank account containing community funds and the specific
amount of the separate deposit is withdrawn to discharge a premarital debt,
the requirements of tracing are satisfied to refute a claim for reimbursement
of community funds used to discharge a "separate debt." 80 On the other
hand, if a bank account is made up of separate funds to which a particular
amount of community funds is added and apparently expended in the course
of doing business, the withdrawal and expenditure of funds in the appropriate
amount of net profits of the business does not demonstrate that all the
remainder must be separate property.81
Most problems of distinction between separate and community character
of property arise out of transactions of spouses with third persons, by
contract or otherwise. The most common types of contracts in this regard are
those of purchase or employment. Whereas property purchased during
marriage is presumed to be community, income from employment is com-
munity by definition. Since community character of the former depends on
acquisition during marriage, the courts have applied the doctrine of inception
of title and the concept of vesting to make this determination. If a contract is
entered into prior to marriage, its incidents are then fixed and the proceeds of
that contract are characterized as separate property. For example, a single
man contracts to perform certain services for his mother and she contracts to
convey certain realty to him in payment for these services. The man marries
before all the services are performed and completes his part of the bargain
while he is married, at which time the promised conveyance is made to him. It
has been said that the conveyance is an integral part of the premarital contract
76. Currie v. Currie, 518 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ dism'd);
Buckler v. Buckler, 424 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1967, writ dism'd), discussed
in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 44, 47 (1969).
77. 542 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ). The case follows Currie v.
Currie, 518 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ dism'd), discussed in
McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 76 (1975).
78. See, e.g., Means v. Means, 535 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ).
79. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (Vernon 1975). But if community property is left undivided
on dissolution of marriage by death of one of the spouses and is left in the charge of the survivor,
there is no presumption that acquisitions made during the second marriage of the survivor belong
to the community of the first marriage. Cook v. Cook, 538 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1976, no writ). See also McKinley v. McKinley, 496 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. 1973).
80. In re Tandy, 532 S.W.2d 714, 717 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ). The court
also discusses lack of proof of source of alleged separate property. Id. at 718-19.
81. Meshwert v. Meshwert, 543 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ granted
on other grounds).
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and the property is, therefore, the man's separate property.8 2 Similarly, if a
single man enters into a contract of insurance on his life and after the marriage
he keeps his part of the bargain by paying premiums, the proceeds payable on
his death while married are separate property since the performance of the
contract relates back to its inception. 83 Again, if realty is conveyed to a single
man who asserts a claim of right and if title is acquired by running of adverse
possession during marriage, the title relates back to its acquisition by con-
veyance.84 It has been said, however, that if a single man goes into possession
of land as a naked trespasser and acquires title by adverse possession while
married, the title does, not relate back to the time the period of possession
began but its character is fixed when title vests. 85 In 1970 the Supreme Court
of Texas decided Busby v. Busby,86 a case concerned with the partition of
benefits of an ex-husband under his military retirement scheme. The man had
entered the military service as a single man. He married several years later.
During marriage he served the requisite number of years to entitle him to
retirement pay although no benefits were then received. He was ordered
retired on account of disability on the very day of his divorce although actual
retirement occurred about a month later. The divorce court did not make any
disposition of subsequent benefits. After the divorce the ex-wife sought
partition of the benefits as community property undivided on divorce which
by operation of law constitute a tenancy in common. 87 Without commenting
on the inception of the husband's right to receive retirement benefits, the
court concluded that his right had vested when he had served the required
time to receive benefits. Since that time had run during the marriage, the
benefits were community property, transformed into a tenancy in common on
divorce without division. Following what they perceived as the rule laid down
in Busby, appellate courts88 applied the vesting rule in divorce cases in order
to determine whether an interest in a retirement or pension fund had achieved
community character for purposes of division. In reaching this conclusion the
appellate courts rejected "if and when" orders made by divorce courts for the
division of benefits if and when received. The Dallas court of civil appeals has
wrestled with a diversity of problems in applying the rule in Busby and has
contributed significantly to the solution. It first sustained an "if and when"
order in Miser v. Miser,89 a divorce case where the serviceman had reenlisted
82. Bishop v. Williams, 223 S.W. 512 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1920, writ ref'd).
83. McCurdy v. McCurdy, 372 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963, writ ref'd); Estate
of Wildenthal, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 519 (1970), discussed in McKnight & Raggio, Family Law,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 51 (1971).
84. Strong v. Garrett, 148 Tex. 265, 224 S.W.2d 471 (1949).
85. Id. As to whether a claim to a faulty title under a warranty deed can constitute a claim of
right compare Scott v. Washburn, 324 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1957, writ ref'd.
n.r.e.), with Brown v. Foster Lumber Co., 178 S.W. 787 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915, writ ref'd).
86. 457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1970).
87. The term "tenancy in common" is applied to interests in personalty as well as realty in
this situation although it would be more precise to refer to the ex-spouses as co-owners of
personalty.
88. Cearley v. Cearley, 536 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin), rev'd on othergrounds, 544
S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976); Bright v. Bright, 531 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no
writ); Lumpkins v. Lumpkins, 519 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Davis v. Davis, 495 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ dism'd).
89. 475 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971, writ dism'd). Though it is not clear
whether similar facts were before the court, a similar result may have been reached in In re
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prior to divorce and the requisite time for vesting of pension rights would be
complete within the enlistment period about eighteen months after the decree
of divorce. In Davis v. Davis,90 however, where the officer-husband would
have had to complete twelve additional years of military service before his
right to benefits would vest, the court distinguished Miser as dealing with an
enlisted man whose benefits would vest during the enlistment period and
rejected the trial court's "if and when" order with respect to the officer-
husband's benefits. 9 1 In all these cases, including Busby, where pension
rights were held to be vested by time in service only, it was evident that
vesting in the sense of absolute entitlement to benefits could be thwarted by
termination of employment prior to receipt of benefits. Termination could
occur as a result of death of the employee or his voluntarily quitting his
position or by his dismissal. In the military service dismissal for dereliction of
duty would, by the terms of employment, cause loss of all rights to future
retirement benefits, even those vested by time in service. This concept of
vested rights, therefore, had a contingent element.
In Dessommes v. Dessommes,92 a case like Busby in that it dealt with
division after divorce, the ex-husband had commenced his employment prior
to marriage. Though retirement rights seem to have vested during this
marriage from the point of satisfying time requirements under the employ-
ment contract, the ex-husband continued to augment the fund after the
divorce, and the retirement plan was superseded by a new one negotiated by
the employer and the employee under which the ex-husband was entitled to an
annuity when he subsequently retired. The trial court concluded that the
ex-wife did not have any interest in the annuity subject to partition. The
Dallas appellate court reversed and remanded with the instruction that the
ex-husband should be allowed to prove how much of the fund was not
attributable to acquisition during the marriage. The court was evidently
concerned that application of the inception of title and vesting doctrines
would not do substantial justice in this situation.
Cearley v. Cearley93 was a divorce case involving retirement rights which
had not vested in the sense that the employee had not served the requisite time
for entitlement to benefits on retirement under the plan. The husband had
been in the military service prior to marriage. He would not be entitled to
retirement benefits until he served at least twenty years, an event that could
occur after the divorce. The marriage lasted eighteen years. Computing the
McCurdy, 489 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, writ dism'd). The Miser and Busby
decisions are noted in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw.
L.J. 66, 73 (1974), and McKnight, FamilyLaw, Annual Surveyof Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 7,30-31
(1973).
90. 495 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas, 1973 writ dism'd), noted in McKnight, Family
Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 73 (1974).
91. The Austin court rejected that distinction in Cearley v. Cearley, 36 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin), rev'd on other grounds, 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976). The Waco court found no
basis for distinguishing retirement benefits of a regular officer from those of a reserve officer.
Ables v. Ables, 540 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 76, no writ). In applying the vesting
doctrine the Corpus Christi court concluded that Naval Fleet Reserve pay is not a vested
retirement benefit, but the vesting test is no longer applicable to this situation. Taggart v. Taggart,
540 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ granted).
92. 505 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.), noted in McKnight,
Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 72-73 (1974).
93. 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976).
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community share in the ratio of eighteen to the number of years served before
retirement, the trial court awarded the wife one half of that amount 94 if and
when received. The Supreme Court of Texas sustained this award and in so
doing characterized prospective retirement rights as contingent community
property assets for purposes of division on divorce. 95 The court noted that this
approach would make unnecessary a further suit by which the wife might seek
partition of her share "after the date that the retirement benefits mature." 96
Beyond this the court did not indicate how a post-divorce partition of
overlooked community assets should be handled. 97 But treatment of interests
having their origin prior to marriage as community assets both in Cearley and
Busby indicates a departure from strict application of the inception of title
rule for the purpose of dealing with interests that accrue over a period of time.
In Busby the husband's retirement had resulted from disability suffered by
a serviceman, and the supreme court pointedly noted that the occasion for
retirement did not affect the character of the right as community property.98
In Ramsey v. Ramsey" the Eastland court nevertheless concluded that
payments received from the Veterans' Administration on account of dis-
abilities apparently incurred during marriage are separate property. This
conclusion has subsequently been distinguished by the El Paso1" and Amaril-
lo 101 courts when considering benefits received on military or other retirement
occasioned by disability. But the Texarkana court'0 2 has recently concluded
that disability payments from the Veterans' Administration constitute sepa-
rate property while those received from the civil service following disability
are community. This conclusion based on section 5.0213 is erroneous, how-
ever, in the absence of proof to rebut the presumption of community laid
down in section 5.01.104
Purchases of property involving third persons present more difficult prob-
lems of analysis and proof. In Bradley v. Bradley10 5 the husband and wife had
agreed with the husband's parents that the husband would arrange for the
purchase of a farm. The parents agreed to make the down-payment and to
discharge future payments toward the purchase price as they came due. It was
further agreed that the parents would occupy the farm during their lifetimes
94. The trial court's formulation of the amount as quoted at id. at 662 is scarcely a model to
be followed, but this seems to be what the court ordered, however ill-expressed.
95. The El Paso court of civil appeals had reached a similar conclusion a week earlier in
Schappell v. Schappell, 544 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no writ).
96. 544 S.W.2d at 666.
97. Nor does the court indicate whether its characterization of assets for purposes of
division on divorce is applicable to division of property at death. For example, on the death of a
non-employee-spouse is there any interest includable in his or her estate with respect to
"unvested" retirement rights of the surviving spouse? A probate court will doubtless soon have
to consider that issue. See Cowgill v. White, 543 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1976, no writ).
98. 457 S.W.2d at 553-54.
99. 474 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972, writ dism'd), criticized in McKnight,
Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 31 (1973).
100. Dominey v. Dominey, 481 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972, no writ), noted in
McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 31 (1973).
101. Copeland v. Copeland, 544 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ).
102. In re Butler, 543 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ).
103. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (Vernon 1975).
104. Id. § 5.01.
105. 540 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ).
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and on their death the husband would get possession of the farm. The
conveyance was to the husband. After the husband's and wife's divorce, in
which there was no disposition of the farm, the wife sought an adjudication of
her community interest in it. There was a finding of fact that the parents had
no intention of making a gift to their son. The court construed the whole
transaction as a contract of acquisition, with the consequence that the
property acquired was presumed to be community property.'°6 If a contract
with a third party involves a purchase on credit 10 7 or is for the loan of
money,108 and if the seller or lender agrees to look solely to the purchasing or
borrowing spouse's separate property for payment, the property bought or
money borrowed is the separate property of that spouse. But apart from the
contractual aspects of such transactions, the fact that property is acquired in
the name of a spouse during marriage does not affect the presumption as
between the spouses that the property is community."° If title is taken in the
name of a third person, it is incumbent upon one who urges its community
character to prove it.110 If the third person is a child of the purchasers, a
presumption of gift' must be rebutted as well. 112 Rebuttal of gift and a
showing of payment of the purchase price with community funds produce a
resulting trust in the third person on behalf of the community. 13 The unilater-
al act of a spouse in secreting funds in the name of a child and later
withdrawing them does not cause them to lose their community character. ' 14
106. In analyzing the incidents of a policy of life insurance in First Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 418 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Tex. 1976), with all relevant facts occurring before the amendment
of TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 23 in 1957, a federal court looked at the situation as it perceived
a court would have done prior to 1957. For subsequent analyses of interests in life insurance
policies see McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey ofTexas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 129, 133
(1968); McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 44, 48-49
(1969); McKnight & Raggio, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 52-53
(1971); McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 31-33
(1973); McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 80-81 (1974).
107. Gleich v. Bongio, 128 Tex. 606, 99 S.W.2d 881 (1937).
108. Ray v. United States, 538 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1976).
109. McGee v. McGee, 537 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ). If title is
taken in the names of both spouses, the spouse who asserts that the property is wholly of a
separate character may introduce evidence to that effect in the absence of recitals of separate
property ownership of the other spouse, Galvan v. Galvan, 534 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1976, no writ); McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw.
L.J. 129, 130-31 (1968); McKnight & Raggio, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw.
L.J. 34, 38-39 (1971). See Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1975), discussed in
McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 77-78 (1976).
110. Harris v. Harris, 174 S.W.2d 996, 999 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1943, no writ).
I11. Smith v. Strahan, 16 Tex. 314 (1856) (dictum).
112. Bell v. Smith, 532 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ). The husband
in the presence of his second wife negotiated to buy a house. He told his attorney to put title in the
name of his son by a prior marriage and explained to his wife when she questioned that decision
that title would later by put in the names of husband and wife. After the transaction was
completed according to the husband's instructions and payment of the purchase price was made
with community funds, the formal state of the title was not altered. In their subsequent divorce,
which occurred after the son's death, the couple's interest in the property was awarded to the
wife, and the husband complied with the court's order to convey his interest in the property to
her. In this instance it seems to have been proved that the couple intended that the son hold the
title beneficially for them and a resulting trust was therefore constituted. Hence, the property
maintained its community character and the wife acquired all of it as a result of the divorce
decree.
113. Id. at 684; cf. DeGrassi v. DeGrassi, 533 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (a conveyance was made by the husband and wife to the husband's son; no
undue influence on the wife was shown; in the absence of proof of other facts by the wife, title in
the son was confirmed).
114. Anderson v. Anderson, 535 S.W.2d 943, 946-47 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ).
See also Carnes v. Meador, 533 S.W.2d 365, 369 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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III. DIVISION ON DIVORCE
The divorce court may not sever the property division from other elements
of a case although difficulty in dividing specific property may result in a
postponement of final disposition of the case. "15 The appellate courts will not
disturb a trial court's exercise of its equitable judgment 16 unless a clear abuse
of discretion can be shown. 11 Such an abuse is difficult to show in view of the
often sparse record on appeal." 8 Although an occasional award seems so
extreme as to warrant reversal, 9 even if the appellate court discerns error in
the conduct of the trial with respect to division, if the division seems fair
under the circumstances, the trial court's conclusion will usually be
sustained.12 0
In Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer2 the Supreme Court of Texas should finally
resolve the longstanding dispute concerning construction of section 3.63,22
with respect to the trial court's power to divide separate real property on
115. Reed v. Williams, 545 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ). In
Burleson v. Burleson, 419 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1967), on remand
sub nom. Carter v. Burleson, 439 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, no
writ), in which a decree of divorce was granted in another jurisdiction while the proceeding was
pending, the court then proceeded to partition (rather than divide) the community property. See
also Mitchim v. Mitchim, 509 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974), rev 'd on other grounds,
518 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1975).
116. In some cases the court may appoint a master in the division process. See TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 2338-9b.2 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77), making such provision for Dallas County.
Otherwise, the use of a master is permissible only in exceptional cases. TEX. R. Civ. P. 171; Bell v.
Bell, 540 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ); TEX. ATr'Y GEN. OP.
No. H-609 (1975). See also Roberson v. Roberson, 420 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Bell, where the use of a master was not warranted by the
circumstances, the appellate court nonetheless held that the master's making findings of fact
which were later employed by the court in making its division did not constitute reversible error
since the complaining spouse could have had a jury trial on all matters of fact if he had requested
it. The court did, however, treat the assessment of the master's fee as erroneous, since no master
should have been appointed.
117. In Hopkins v. Hopkins, 540 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ),
it was indicated that the court might consider the innocent spouse's loss of medical benefits in
making a division of property. In Roberts v. Roberts, 535 S.W.2d 373, 374 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1976, no writ), it was suggested that the wife's being 20 years older than her husband might
support a division in her favor.
118. When there is no statement or findings of fact, the appellate court must resolve all
disputes in favor of the trial court's conclusions. See, e.g., Fuqua v. Fuqua, 541 S.W.2d 228,
229-30 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ); Collins v. Collins, 540 S.W.2d 497,498 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1976, no writ); Williams v. Williams, 537 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1976, no writ). But see note 55 and accompanying text.
119. In Dietz v. Dietz, 540 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no writ), the wife was
awarded less than one percent of the community estate without any reasonable basis and an abuse
of discretion was found. See also Mial v. Mial, 543 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no
writ); Boriack v. Boriack, 541 S.W.2d 237, 242-43 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ
dism'd).
120. In Bell v. Bell, 540 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ), it
was erroneous for the trial court to strike the husband's allegation of the wife's adultery, but
under the circumstances the error was treated as harmless. See also McGee v. McGee, 537
S.W.2d 94 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ) (harmless error, if any, in finding the value
of particular property). A possibly incorrect finding as to value or characterization of property
will not necessarily cause reversal. Fuqua v. Fuqua, 541 S.W.2d 228, 299-30 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1976, no writ). See also McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
29 Sw. L.J. 67, 79 n.94 (1975). But a substantial error will not be allowed to stand. Freeman v.
Freeman, 497 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ). It was said in
Spiller v. Spiller, 535 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ), that the wife had no
ground to complain that property was awarded to her as her separate property rather than
community.
121. 535 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ granted).
122. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon 1975).
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divorce. The majority of courts of appeals which have addressed the question
have tended to the conclusion that title to separate realty may be divested in
favor of the other spouse,' 23 but prior to the supreme court's reaching a
decision it had been recommended to the Texas House of Representatives
that legislation be adopted to bar division of all separate property on
divorce. 12
4
Pension and Retirement Benefits. The courts of appeals had been sharply
divided on the issue of whether pension and retirement rights that had neither
accrued nor matured were subject to division on divorce.'25 In Cearley v.
CearleyI2 6 the supreme court held that these interests should be treated as
contingent community property for property division purposes. In doing so,
the court intimated a clear preference for the "if and when" type of decree
when division is sought of rights that have not accrued because of insufficient
time of employment. The court did not absolutely reject a division of property
based on the present value of future rights and liabilities, 127 but when pension
rights are a significant asset of the marriage the "if and when" decree seems
to be the better approach since the risk that an interest may not mature is
divided equally between the parties. The same reasoning indicates that the
latter approach is to be preferred over the use of a conjectural present value of
an interest as a factor in overall division of assets. 28
Cearley disposed of some problems, but it raises others concerning the
amount of benefits and whether the principle of the case is applicable to other
123. Baxla v. Baxla, 522 S.W.2d 736, 739-40 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ);
Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 515 S.W.2d 52, 56-57 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no writ). See also In
re Butler, 543 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ) (dictum); Looney v.
Looney, 541 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ) (dictum); Burns v. Burns,
541 S.W.2d 280, 282 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ) (dictum); Dietz v. Dietz, 540
S.W.2d 418, 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no writ) (dictum). Contra, Eggemeyer v.
Eggemeyer, 535 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ granted); Ramirez v. Ramirez,
524 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, no writ). See also McKnight, Family Law,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 82 (1976). By confining its comments to separate
personalty in Spiller v. Spiller, 535 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ), there was
some indication that the Tyler court had changed its position. Cf. Merrell v. Merrell, 527 S.W.2d
250 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (dictum as to separate realty).
124. 4 HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 65TH LEGISLATURE OF TEXAS, INTERIM REPORT 3 (1976).
This is a stronger stand than that taken in the 64th and 63d sessions merely to restore the language
of art. 4638 repealed in 1971. See McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw.
L.J. 66, 75 n.64 (1974).
125. For holdings allowing division see Schappell v. Schappell, 544 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1976, no writ); In re McCurdy, 489 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973,
writ dism'd); Miser v. Miser, 475 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971, writ dism'd). Contra
Cearley v. Cearley, 536 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin), rev'don othergrounds, 544 S.W.2d
661 (Tex. 1976); Bright v. Bright, 531 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no writ);
Lumpkins v. Lumpkins, 519 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Davis
v. Davis, 495 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ dism'd).
126. 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976).
127. The present value of contingent liabilities was considered in Means v. Means, 535
S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ). Potential liability may in some circum-
stances, however, be too speculative for consideration in making a property division. See
Fonstein v. Fonstein, 17 Cal. 3d 783, 552 P.2d 1169, 131 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1976), discussed in 3
COMM. PROP. J. 251 (1976).
128. The use of the "if and when" order also discourages giving effect to the kind of rigid
reasoning that produces hardship results as in In re Marriage of Smith, 56 Cal. App. 3d 247, 128
Cal. Rptr. 410 (1976), where the California court said that the ex-wife was entitled to immediate
monthly payments although the husband, who had not yet retired, was not receiving benefits. In
the use of the "if and when" order, it must be realized that some reasonable self-interested
choices of the pensioner may be made within the limits of the retirement plan. See editorial
comments on In re Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976), in 3 COMM.
PROP. J. 125-26 (1976).
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types of "unvested interests." The established rule in division of property
prevents a divorce court from considering an anticipated increase in amount
of pension benefits due to an employee's continued employment after di-
vorce. 2 9 Consistent with this rule, the El Paso court of civil appeals recently
held that division must be based on the pensioner's pay-status at the time of
the divorce and not at some future date. '30 But can the principle of Cearley be
confined to unaccrued pension and retirement rights? Prevailing Texas
authority treats a husband's future right to receive renewal commissions on
life insurance policies sold by him as an insurance agent as "unvested" prior
to divorce and, hence, not subject to division on divorce. 131 A California court
reached the same conclusion, 132 but there was a strong dissent resting on In re
Brown,133 on which the Supreme Court of Texas relied so heavily in Cearley.
Whereas for practical purposes contingent interests in certain pension plans
are virtually certain to accrue, the accrual of other types of potential interests
is far less certain. These interests, although analogous to prospective pension
benefits in theory, may, therefore, be looked upon as mere expectancies for
purposes of division on divorce. A right in real property founded on color of
title that will ripen by adverse possession in the remote future is probably
such an interest. A likelihood of inheritance is certainly one. Whatever the
facts involving one of these situations, divorce courts must make allowance
for the contingent nature of the interest, and, in the case of pension rights
particularly, the divorce court must bear in mind that the principal object of
providing them is future support of the pensioner.
Reimbursement for Benefits to One Marital Estate Made by Another. The
accepted general rules for reimbursement for improvements and other be-
nefits of one marital estate made by another were reiterated by the Beaumont
court, 134 and the Texarkana court' 35 reapplied the rule that living expenses
defrayed as a separate expense are not reimbursable.136 Although it has long
129. In re Rister, 512 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). See also
Dessommes v. Dessommes, 505 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
130. Schappell v. Schappell, 544 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Civ. App.-EI Paso 1976, no writ). Cf. In
re Freiberg, 57 Cal. App. 3d 304, 127 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1976), which evidences a tendency on the
part of California courts to think in terms of alimony and property division simultaneously.
Increase in earning power is, of course, relevant to fixing child support, but that is a very different
process from the division of property. See Goren v. Goren, 531 S.W.2d 897, 900 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1975, no writ).
131. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 183 S.W.2d 985 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1944, no writ).
132. In re Skaden, 132 Cal. Rptr. 524 (Ct. App. 1976)..
133. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
134. Looney v. Looney, 541 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ). In
Collins v. Collins, 540 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ), the application of the
rule with respect to improvements was apparently based on a finding that cost and enhancement
were the same or the latter exceeded the former.
135. In re Long, 542 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ).
136. In Dickson v. Dickson, 544 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ), the court
alludes to the fact that family support had depended largely on the separate wealth of the wife and
its income as a ground for supporting an award to the wife of separate shares of the husband.
Those shares had been acquired by him as mutations of a gift from his wife under circumstances
which smacked of undue influence. Reliance on the support argument is ill-founded, however.
The facts of Dickson respecting the gift are reminiscent of those in Bohn v. Bohn, 420 S.W.2d 165
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1967, writ dism'd), on remand, 455 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1970, no writ). See McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 39-40 (197 1); McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw.
L.J. 129, 131 (1968). However, the disposition of separate property as a consequence of
interspousal gift in Dickson conjures up the spirit of Fitts v. Fitts, 14 Tex. 443 (1855).
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been established that a claim for reimbursement is waived if its elements are
not proved, 13 7 some appellate courts have continued to approve a trial court's
consideration of unproved amounts expended by one marital estate for the
benefit of another in balancing the equities of property division.
138
Attorney's Fees. In Carle v. Carle'39 the supreme court clearly enunciated
the rule that an award for attorney's fees is merely an element in equitable
division of property on divorce. There are numerous recent examples of the
point's application. 40 The award must, however, be based on competent
evidence as to amount, 141 and no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court is shown by its refusal to award attorney's fees to either party. 42 It is
also within the court's discretion to allow fees for appeal; 43 therefore, care
should be taken in the drafting of pleadings to provide for this eventuality."
Once the wife's attorney's fees are awarded by the divorce court, the issue is
res judicata as to any subsequent suit which the wife's attorney may bring
against the husband. 14 Attorney's fees may also be awarded in a divorce
proceeding that fails to go to judgment, as when one of the parties dies. In that
instance, however, such an award is not an incident of property division."
Division of Nonpartitionable Property and the Alimony Problem. In 1971
the Beaumont court of civil appeals held that an appropriate means of dividing
property not susceptible to partition was to award a money judgment in lieu of
partition. 147 The practice had by then become so widespread and generally
accepted that the opinion seemed scarcely worthy of note. Use of this device
to achieve equalization of shares is still very common. 148 An extension of this
device is that of ordering one spouse to pay the other a fixed sum over a period
of time. In some quarters this practice is also regarded as unexceptionable. 14
9
137. Williams v. Williams, 537 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ). Waiver
by application of the doctrine of election is exemplified by Stutts v. Stovall, 531 S.W.2d 690 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ).
138. Burns v. Burns, 541 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ);
Means v. Means, 535 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ).
139. 149 Tex. 469, 234 S.W.2d 1002 (1951).
140. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 537 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no
writ); Cearley v. Cearley, 536 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin), rev'd on othergrounds, 544
S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976).
141. Meshwert v. Meshwert, 543 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ granted
on other grounds). In Hopkins v. Hopkins, 539 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976,
writ dism'd), the court pointed out that the amount of attorney's fees could be proved on remand.
142. Boriack v. Boriack, 541 S.W.2d 237,243 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ).
143. Dickson v. McWilliams, 543 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no
writ). In Dietz v. Dietz, 540 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no writ), the appellate
court affirmed the award of attorney's fees without prejudice to the wife's seeking further
attorney's fees on remand.
144. See Carson v. Carson, 528 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ), where the
court held that a prayer for a sum certain for attorney's fees precluded a larger award.
145. Dickson v. McWilliams, 543 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no
writ). In Pearson v. Pearson, 356 N.E.2d 993 (Ill. App. 1976), an Illinois court held that if a
property settlement without provision for attorney's fees is incorporated in the decree, a court is
precluded from subsequent consideration of the matter.
146. See In re Parr, 543 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ).
147. Weaks v. Weaks, 471 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1971, writ dism'd). See
also Kirkham v. Kirkham, 335 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1960, no writ).
148. See, e.g., In re Jackson, 506 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ dism'd).




Other courts are of the opinion that ordering periodic payments of a fixed sum
is an award of permanent alimony,150 an award which is forbidden in Texas. 1 51
Notwithstanding the condemnation of awards of permanent alimony,
division of property on divorce in Texas has always been affected by the
reasoning underlying alimony awards. Because equitable division of property
on divorce has, since the Divorce Act of 1841,152 rested almost entirely on the
concept of fault as the ground for divorce, Texas courts have always regarded
the future needs of the innocent spouse as a significant consideration in
making a division. As long as the grounds for divorce were at least nominally
based on fault,'" it was not often apparent that divorce courts thought in
terms of alimony in making a division. When attorneys began to shift their
reliance from fault to no-fault grounds of insupportability, however, the
motivation of the courts became more obvious. 154 The influence of the
alimony principle becomes even more obvious when a court makes an award
for periodic payments that will cease on remarriage of the recipient. 55
The Fort Worth court of civil appeals found an award of alimony in an order
to make periodic payments that were not specifically connected with existing
property. 56 Thus, it appears that the trial court must identify the existing
property from which the payments are to be made to avoid a later argument
that the court made an award of permanent alimony to be paid out of future
earnings. 57 Yet, despite the court's concern for avoiding an award of
alimony, its further discussion betrays a marked degree of alimony-based
thinking. First, the court felt that future earning power was relevant to a
determination of the amount to be paid, and, second, the court remedied the
trial court's error by reforming the decree so that the sum would be paid from
a trust estate held beneficially for the payor or from the future income of the
150. In re Long, 542 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ).
151. See McKnight, Book Review, II Sw. L.J. 272, 274 (1957).
152. Tex. Laws 1841, An Act Concerning Divorce and Alimony § 4, at 20,2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS
OF TEXAS 484 (1898).
153. Until Jan. 1, 1972, the ground for divorce alleged in the vast preponderance of cases was
cruelty, though professional experience showed that this was merely a euphemism for marital
breakdown to bring the cause for divorce within statutory grounds. See McKnight, Commentary
to the Texas Family Code, Title 1, 5 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 281, 320-21 (1974).
154. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.01 (Vernon 1975).
155. See, e.g., Benedict v. Benedict, 542 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ
dism'd). If the obligation to make further payments is to cease on the occurrence of an event
seemingly unrelated to the cause for divorce or the extent of the property to be divided, it is hard
to believe that the trial court was thinking in terms of anything other than an award of alimony. In
Goren v. Goren, 531 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [list Dist.] 1975, writ dism'd), the
wife was awarded $15,000 to be paid in five annual installments in an instance when community
indebtedness exceeded the aggregate of tangible assets of the marriage. Unnecessarily troubled
by the net condition of the community, the appellate court said that the divorce court was entitled
to consider other factors in awarding what it thought might smack of alimony. The other factors,
which the court identifies as the husband's earning power and the wife's future needs, themselves
smack of alimony. But the net approach to property interest is clearly unsound. See Meshwert v.
Meshwert, 543 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ granted) (dictum); In re
Greer, 483 S.W.2d 490, 493-94 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972, writ dism'd). See also Uranga v.
Uranga, 527 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ dism'd).
156. Benedict v. Benedict, 542 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ dism'd).
In In re Long, 542 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ), the court found
alimony in an order merely to pay a fixed sum in monthly installments. SeealsoExparte Neff,
542 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ).
157. The Texas Supreme Court's finding of an award of alimony in Ex parte Yates, 387
S.W.2d 377 (Tex. 1965), is clearly based on the assumption that the ordered payment would be
made from future earnings.
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trust. '5 Such reformation, however, does not seem to run afoul of the
strictures of McKnight v. McKnight,159 where the Supreme Court of Texas
made it clear that an appellate court may not reform an order in such a way
that it purports to exercise the discretionary powers of the trial court.
Enforcement. Contempt of a court's order as evidenced by an ex-spouse's
failure to comply with the order may cause the other ex-spouse to seek
coercion by means of a civil contempt citation. 60 In Ex parte Sutherland6 1
the Supreme Court of Texas held in 1975 that if an ex-spouse is ordered to pay
money, as received, into the registry of the court for the benefit of the other
spouse, the contempt powers of the ordering court are available to enforce
compliance. In Ex parte Anderson 162 the San Antonio court of civil appeals
extended the principle to include orders made to pay the ex-spouse directly.
In so doing the court distinguished the earlier supreme court decision in Ex
parte Yates ,63 a seemingly related but quite different case involving a rather
peculiar order. In Yates the husband held a promissory note which evidenced
a substantial debt from a third person. The divorce court awarded the wife
half of the amount owed, ordered the husband to deliver the note to the wife
as security for his payment to her, and further ordered the husband to pay her
$500 a month to redeem the note. The Texas Supreme Court held that since
the wife was in effect awarded a money judgment which the husband was to
pay from his future earnings, the order could not be enforced by contempt. In
Anderson the San Antonio court held that this conclusion was substantially
different from that in Sutherland where the husband was deemed a trustee of
the periodic future pension benefits and ordered to pay the wife's share into
158. 542 S.W.2d at 697,700. Whether the husband or a third party was the settlor of the trust is
not indicated in the opinion.
159. 543 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. 1976). The same may be said of Collins v. Collins, 540 S.W.2d497
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ), and Hopkins v. Hopkins, 539 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ dism'd), although in each case reformation involved matters of law,
not merely correction of clerical errors. In Collins the appellate court reformed the application of
principles of reimbursement so that reimbursement in favor of the husband was taken from the
wife's share of the community rather than the entire community. In Hopkins reformation
amounted to striking part of the trial court's order that gave affirmative relief against a third party
as the husband's agent. In Dessommes v. Dessommes, 543 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the matter had been remanded for a new trial with instructions
and indications of how the property should be divided if those instructions could not be complied
with. Dessommes v. Dessommes, 505 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). On further appeal after a trial that did not comply with the instructions the order of the
earlier trial was reformed along the lines indicated in the earlier appeal. In McKnight v. McKnight
the Supreme Court of Texas was cautious to indicate that its opinion did not cover matters of
remittitur as in Dietz v. Dietz, 540 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no writ).
For some recent authorities dealing with the tax consequences of various types of property
arrangements in connection with divorce see Esther Walker, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 239 (1976)
(voluntary alimony payments, not a part of property settlement, defined as alimony for income
tax purposes); Elizabeth L. Deyoe, 66 T.C. 904 (1976) (gain on sale between spouses pending
divorce treated as ordinary income); Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-10 I.R.B. 14 (approximately equal
division of community property resulting in no gain or loss and assets' retaining community
property basis).
160. As a general rule a court cannot adjudge a person in contempt of an order of another
court that made the order. Exparte Alvarado, 543 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no
writ). If one is adjudged in contempt of an order embodying invalid as well as valid elements,
detention under such an adjudication is invalid. Ex parte Harwell, 538 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1976, no writ).
161. 526 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. 1975).
162. 541 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ).
163. 387 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. 1965).
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the registry of the court. In Anderson the court concluded that the order
should be enforced by contempt if the husband was ordered to pay the wife
directly in a like situation. This conclusion cannot be seriously disputed. The
order in Yates was very peculiar and ambiguous. The supreme court's
response to it should not be generalized to mean that an order to make period
payments of money rendered in the course of dividing marital property is
unenforcible by contempt. If it were, such a conclusion would conflict with
Sutherland unless that later case is confined to its subject matter of pension
and retirement benefits and like interests. In Ex parte Preston,164 which
antedates Yates by four years, the supreme court held that an order to make a
lump sum payment of money from a specific source was enforcible by
contempt. The courts must clarify this confusing situation with some definite
general rules.
Relying on Yates and Preston, 65 the Fort Worth court of civil appeals held
in Ex parte Neff' 66 that an order to pay money from unspecified funds was not
enforcible by contempt. Although Neff involved an agreed order, no particu-
lar point was made of that fact 67 nor of how the situation might have been
affected if the decree had incorporated a property settlement agreement to
the same effect. 6
The cases discussed do not deal with the problem of recurrent contempt
which may arise in connection with an order to make successive payments.
This sort of problem arises most frequently in relation to child-support
orders, but the principle is equally applicable to a continuing duty to pay
money in circumstances in which non-compliance would allow resort to a
contempt citation. In Garrison v. Garrison69 there is discussion of a court's
power to cite for contempt in order to guard against future contemptuous
acts.
Although an order to deliver or convey property may be coerced through
the use of the contempt power, there is little authority with respect to the use
of a writ of possession. If realty is awarded to a spouse on divorce, the writ of
164. 162 Tex. 379, 347 S.W.2d 938 (1961).
165. The court also relied on Ex parte Jones, 163 Tex. 513, 358 S.W.2d 370 (1962), and Ex
parte Duncan, 462 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1970, no writ).
166. 542 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ).
167. An agreed order concerning property in dispute in a divorce proceeding was said to
amount to a contract between the parties in Spiller v. Sherrill, 518 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ). Supersedeas was filed. The trial court then purported to
dissolve the agreed order. That action was stayed by writ of prohibition from the San Antonio
court of civil appeals because of the quality of the agreement as a contract. On appeal (to a
different appellate court) the court held that the agreed order was final. Spiller v. Spiller, 535
S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ).
168. An agreement to make periodic monetary payments under a separation contract is
enforcible as a term of that contract. Mere incorporation of the terms of the agreement in a
decree of divorce is harmless and does not render it subject to an attack as an award of permanent
alimony. Griffin v. Griffin, 535 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ). See
McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 77 (1975). As a contractual
obligation the terms of the agreement may be enforced in domestic relations courts with
jurisdiction to adjudicate issues concerning contracts arising from divorce decrees and contrac-
tual settlements included therein. Black v. Wilemon, 539 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1976, no writ). But a suit for contractual child support payments under a settlement
agreement that specifically provides for contractual enforcement under TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
14.06(d) (Vernon 1975) is not "a suit affecting the parent-child relationship" and is, therefore, not
subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the divorce court. Adwan v. Adwan, 538 S.W.2d 192,195
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
169. 544 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ).
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possession can be used to put the spouse in possession. Rule 31070 merely
provides for the writ's use in connection with real property in other instances,
but rules 632 and 633171 clearly imply its use with respect to personal property
as well as realty. The availability of enforcement by contempt of a properly
drawn decree ordering delivery or conveyance or granting possesion should
obviate recourse to the writ of possession with the possible exception of a
grant of possession to realty.
Division After Divorce. Recourse to the federal courts for the enforcement
of division of property on divorce has met with little success. In Morrison v.
Morrison 172 a federal district court denied itself the power to enforce the state
court decree, and in Kerbow v. Kerbow 73 another federal court disclaimed
the power to enforce a decree in favor of wives against husbands' employers
for pension benefits. A similar conclusion 174 was reached elsewhere in an
effort to reach the pay account of a serviceman, a fractional part of which had
been awarded to the wife. After careful consideration of the legislative
history of the Social Services Amendment Act of 1974,175 the court concluded
that the federal court lacked the judicial power to enforce the decree.
In a federal case in Oklahoma 76 an unsuccessful attempt was made to
garnish the pension funds of a retired serviceman to satisfy a decree of
child-support. The court held that relief was precluded by Oklahoma law
forbidding garnishment of wages. 177 In Texas efforts to avoid liability under a
divorce decree by means of a voluntary petition in bankruptcy have been
almost as unsuccessful 178 as attempts to enforce divorce decrees in the federal
court. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 79 however, drew a distinction
between an obligation arising out of a division of property (a dischargeable
liability) and alimony to be paid out of future earnings (an undischargeable
debt). 80 The distinction rests on the same arguments as those relied on by the
Fort Worth court of civil appeals in Benedict in distinguishing between a
property division and a forbidden award of permanent alimony by a Texas
court.
170. TEX. R. Civ. P. 310.
171. TEX. R. Civ. P. 632, 633.
172. 408 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
173. 3 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2020 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 1976).
174. Wilhelm v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 418 F. Supp. 162 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1970).
176. Crane v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Okla. 1976).
177. Other jurisdictions prohibiting garnishment of wages are Florida, Pennsylvania, and
South Carolina.
178. See McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 88-89 (1976);
McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 92 (1975); McKnight,
Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66,77-78 (1974); McKnight, Matrimonial
Property, AnnualSurvey of Texas Law, 27Sw. L.J. 27,42(1973). In In re Nunnally, 506 F.2d 1024
(5th Cir. 1975), discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J.
67, 92 (1975), no point was made of the "secured" status of the wife's interest, and that factor
opens up other interesting problems.
179. Nichols v. Hensler, 528 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1976).
180. Elsewhere, federal courts were not so careful in analyzing these matters. See, e.g., In re
Knuppenburg, 422 F. Supp. 274 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (construing attorney's fees as "alimony"
without any allusion to whether the attorney's fees were attributable to an award of alimony or
property division); In re Golden, 411 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (in effect construing as
"alimony" for purposes of the Bankruptcy Act anything the divorce court calls "alimony" even
though it may include contractual penalties agreed by the parties and approved by the court).
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In several instances collateral attacks were mounted against foreign
alimony decrees when suits were brought in Texas to enforce arrears. The
most meritorious attack' involved a question of constitutionality of the
foreign statute under which the award was made. The Kentucky statute, since
repealed, provided for alimony for women but not for men. Without alluding
to Lipshy v. Lipshy,8 2 but relying on Georgia authority,8 3 the court con-
cluded that the statute was constitutional. '1
In another case' 85 a Texas divorce was granted the husband without
exertion of personal jurisdiction over the wife but after she had commenced a
proceeding for judicial separation in Maryland. After the Texas judgment
became final the wife amended her Maryland complaint to seek alimony.
Personal jurisdiction over the husband was achieved and judgment was
rendered against him for permanent alimony. In a later Maryland proceeding
a money judgment was rendered against the husband for arrears. The wife
brought suit in Texas on her Maryland money judgment. 186 In this Vanderbilt-
type 8 7 case, the Texas court held that the Maryland judgment was subject to
full faith and credit. 8 8
In the situation when a foreign divorce has been granted without division of
property held by a spouse residing in Texas, 89 a Texas court faced with the
problem of making a division would seem to be limited to partition rather than
181. Hendricks v. Hendricks, 535 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
182. 525 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ dism'd). There the court rejected the
argument that the Texas Constitution (TEX. CONST. art. I. § 3a) precludes an award of attorney's
fees to a wife as constituting sex discrimination. The court pointed out that either spouse may be
entitled to attorney's fees under Texas law. The implication of the court's remark is that such
limited relief to a spouse of one sex but not to the other would be inadmissibly discriminatory and
unconstitutional. See also Felsenthal v. McMillan, 493 S.W.2d 729, 729-30 (Tex. 1973); Com-
ment, The ERA and Texas MaritalLaw, 54TEXAS L. REV. 590 (1976). In Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct.
451, 50 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1976), the Supreme Court held that the Oklahoma statute prohibiting sales
of beer to males under 21 and females under 18 was gender-based discrimination without
reasonable factual support and therefore unconstitutional. In Mathews v. de Castro, 97 S. Ct.
431, 50 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1976), different treatment of divorced wives of Social Security ben-
eficiaries and wives of Social Security beneficiaries is reasonable and, therefore, not
discriminatory.
183. Murphy v. Murphy, 232 Ga. 352, 206 S.E.2d 458 (1974).
184. The court, however, ignored Pennsylvania authorities construing a constitutional provi-
sion similar to that in the Texas Constitution. See Wiegrand v. Wiegrand, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 278,
310 A.2d 426 (1973); DeRosa v. DeRosa, 60 Pa. D. & C.2d 71 (C.P. Delaware Co. 1972); Kehl v.
Kehl, 57 Pa. D. & C.2d 164 (C.P. Allegheny Co. 1972).
185. Layton v. Layton, 538 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ). Though
the Texas divorce court overruled the wife's special appearance to contest jurisdiction, what that
meant in terms of adversely affecting the wife's rights is not clear. It appears that the Maryland
court assumed that the Texas court had not exerted personal jurisdiction over the wife. For
another view of Layton, see 55 TEXAS L. REV. 127 (1976).
186. It is not necessary to reduce foreign arrears of alimony to a money judgment before
bringing suit in Texas. Wilder v. Wilder, 543 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no writ).
187. See Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
188. Other full faith and credit situations involved a variety of points of pleading and practice:
Cutler v. Cutler, 543 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (timely motion
under TEX. R. Civ. P. 184a to take judicial notice of foreign law to show that foreign alimony
decree is final); Hatfield v. Christoph, 539 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ)(presumed validity of nunc pro tunc correction of order by foreign court). See also Vandervoort
v. Vandervoort, 529 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1976) (foreign judgment not subject to collateral attack in
federal diversity suit on the grounds of fraud in the foreign proceeding).
189. In a dictum in Bradley v. Bradley, 540 S.W.2d 504, 512 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1976, no writ), the court states that a foreign divorce court lacks power to make a division of
Texas realty. But such divisions have been approved by Texas appellate courts on numerous
occasions.
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an equitable division." A proportional partition based on time and place
acquired in the case of incremental acquisitions seems authorized by Cearley,
but the language of Cearley implies that division cannot be had until the
interest is vested in the traditional sense. 9 If this is not so, however, and an
undivided, unaccrued, and unmatured interest is partitionable after divorce,
the passage of time that will bar a claim would seem to begin to run at the date
of divorce or as soon thereafter as sufficient claims are asserted by the
possessor to start the running of time in his favor.'
92
In Constance v. Constance93 the Supreme Court of Texas indicated a more
liberal approach to the construction of divorce decrees dealing with property
division than previously adopted by the courts of civil appeals. 94 There,
retirement benefits of the husband were referred to in recitals of the decree as
being set aside to the husband but no specific disposition was made of them in
the decretal part of the decree. The supreme court held that the benefits had
been adequately adverted to in order to achieve their division.'
95
In Starkey v. Holoye' 9 a different kind of construction question was
examined. The decree awarded the husband occupancy of the community
home with "all future payments and equity created in such property. . . by
payments made [by him to be his] . . .separate property."' 19 In a later
dispute with respect to the interests of the former spouses in the property, the
court held that the house, with its incremental increase in value, was a
tenancy in common between the ex-spouses with a right of the husband to be
compensated for payments he had made toward discharge of the purchase
money lien.
In Smith v. Smith 198 the Dallas court of civil appeals concluded that a will in
favor of a spouse who was later divorced but subsequently remarried to the
testator was valid with respect to the beneficiary-spouse's interest in spite of
190. In Note, Foreign Divorce and Texas Community Property, 28 BAYLOR L. REv425 (1976),
reprinted in 3 COMM. PROP. J. 236 (1976), the author suggests an equitable division, but his
argument is unconvincing.
191. Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex. 1976).
192. The Austin court of civil appeals had said in Cearley by way of obiter dictum that no right
arises which can be barred by passage of time or adverse claim until the benefit is matured. In
Dessommes v. Dessommes, 543 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ), the
court had said that time did not run until the right had accrued. But the supreme court's approach
(apart from its language at 544 S.W.2d at 666) suggests that rights are sufficiently held in the case
of incremental acquisitions to allow an adverse right to be asserted earlier. In Taggart v. Taggart,
540 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ granted), laches or estoppel was
seemingly argued and rejected by the court as inapplicable to the "unvested" interest.
193. 544 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. 1976), rev'g 537 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976).
194. See Dessommes v. Dessommes, 461 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). In Taggart v. Taggart, 540 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ
granted), the property settlement referred to the husband's retirement benefits, but the decree
was silent with respect to them.
195. In the very different situation of Adwan v. Adwan, 538 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1976, no writ), where community property overlooked in drafting the property
settlement agreement as well as the decree was sold prior to divorce by the husband who later
used the proceeds to pay debts assumed by him under the agreement, the husband was made to
account to the wife for these funds as held in common after the divorce. With respect to a tax
refund received after divorce and also unprovided for by the parties' agreement and the decree,
the court held that there was nothing to divide because it had been applied to an outstanding tax
deficiency. See also Busse v. United States, 542 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1976).
196. 536 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ).
197. Id. at 440.
198. 519 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd).
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section 69 of the Probate Code' 99 which provides that divorce terminates an
ex-spouse's interest in a former spouse's will. In McFarlen v. McFarlen2° the
Eastland court of civil appeals examined a further variation of this situation.
The husband and wife were divorced in 1968. In 1972 the husband made a will
in favor of his ex-wife whom he remarried later that year. But the spouses
were again divorced in 1974. The ex-wife was held to lose her interest under
the will as a result of the divorce.
IV. MANAGEMENT AND LIABILITY OF MARITAL PROPERTY
In the management of separate or community property, the fact that one
spouse holds property in the name of a third person or in the joint names of
that spouse and a third person does not, without more, imply a gift to that third
person. In Anderson v. Anderson 201 a wife secreted community property in a
savings account in her son's name, but subject to withdrawal by her, so that
she might appear to qualify for old-age assistance benefits. The community
character of the property was held not to have been affected. 20 2 Reference to
rights of survivorship in the third person, however, implies an intention to
create a contractual benefit in favor of the third person.2 °3 When that third
person participates in the handling of a joint account the transaction is
completed in his favor. 201 The gratuitous transfer of community property by
one spouse to a third person works a constructive fraud upon the other
spouse. This marital constructive fraud, however, is not void as a fraudulent
transfer under section 24.02 of the Business and Commerce Code 215 without a
further showing of an intent to defraud.206 As a constructive fraud it is
voidable at the instance of the other spouse, but only to the extent that the
spouse's community interest in the property cannot be reimbursed out of
other property of the donor-spouse. 207
In Pope Photo Records v. Malone208 a creditor asserted that when a
husband-debtor named his wife as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy
the proceeds were subject to the husband's debts because he died insolvent.
Relying on a similar conclusion in Parker Square State Bank v. Huttash,29 the
court in Pope Photo found that the gift was complete before insolvency at the
time the policy was taken out and that, therefore, the transaction was not a
fraudulent transfer within section 24.03 of the Business and Commerce
Code. 210 If the husband had retained the right to change the beneficiary, the
199. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 69 (Vernon 1956).
200. 536 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, no writ).
201. 535 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ). See also Bell v. Smith, 532
S.W.2d 680 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ) (husband's taking title to realty in name
of son).
202. Dealing with separate property in the same manner would not constitute a gift. Carnes v.
Meador, 533 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
203. Id.
204. Anderson v. Anderson, 535 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ).
205. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 24.02 (Vernon 1968).
206. Carnes v. Meador, 533 S.W.2d 365,372 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
207. Id.
208. 539 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ).
209. 484 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in
McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 43 (1973).
210. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 24.03 (Vernon 1968).
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court overlooked the clear language of Volunteer State Life Insurance Co. v.
Hardin2"1 that a reservation by the insured of the right to change the policy
beneficiary deprives a named beneficiary of any vested interest in the
insurance proceeds prior to the death of the insured. Only a transfer by the
husband of ownership of the policy and all its incidents to his wife before his
death would constitute a valid inter vivos gift. On the other hand, article
3836(a)(6)1 makes the cash surrender value of a life insurance policy exempt
from claims of the general creditors of the insured. Even though section
21.22213 of the Insurance Code exempts only periodically paid insurance
benefits from the process of debt collection and does not exempt proceeds
paid in a lump sum 214 when creditors of a beneficiary seek to reach them,
creditors of the transferor should be precluded from asserting that proceeds
represent the fruits of a fraudulent transfer when the subject matter of the
inter vivos transfer, i.e., the cash surrender value, was exempt when the
transfer was made. Exempt property may be the subject matter of a gift by a
debtor-even an insolvent one-because his creditors might not have had
resort to such property anyway. 21 5
Unable to reach all the proceeds of an insurance policy, the creditor in Pope
Photo nevertheless argued that he should be able to reach that part of the
proceeds proportionate to premiums paid during insolvency. Although al-
lowed in some jurisdictions, 216 this approach was rejected in San Jacinto
Building, Inc. v. Brown2t absent an allegation that the beneficiary spouse
was a party to the fraud. The creditor in Pope Photo failed to argue, as allowed
in some jurisdictions, that the premiums themselves paid during insolvency
were fraudulently transferred.2 18
The creditors of the husband also argued and speculated that the purchase
of the policy in favor of the wife somehow supplied an association between
the spouses to which the principles of vicarious liability could be applied as in
Cockerham v. Cockerham.1 9 But even with that exaggerated example before
it, the court was unable to construe these facts as a situation of joint liability
for the husband's indebtedness. The Judiciary Committee of the Texas House
of Representatives has responded to Cockerham in this survey period by
recommending 2 0 a clarification of section 5.22221 of the Family Code, so that
211. 145 Tex. 245, 249-50, 197 S.W.2d 105,107 (1946), discussed in First Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 418 F. Supp. 955, 960 (N.D. Tex. 1976). See also Howard v. Howard, 158 S.W.2d 591
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1942, writ ref'd).
212. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3836(a), (b) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
213. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.22 (Vernon 1963).
214. Preston v. Martin, 69 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1943, no writ); Union Say.
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Smith, 62 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1933, writ ref'd).
215. See Morris v. Morris, 482 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, no writ).
216. See Annot., 106 A.L.R. 596, (1937), supplementing 6 A.L.R. 1173 (1920); 23 COLUM. L.
REV. 771 (1923); 26 HARV. L. REV. 362 (1912).
217. 79 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1935, no writ).
218. See 23 COLUM. L. REV. 771 (1923). The cumulative amount of premiums paid while
insolvent was presumably of too small an amount to make recourse to this argument worthwhile.
219. 527 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1975), analyzed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 90-91 (1976).
220. 4 HousE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 65TH LEGISLATURE OF TEXAS, INTERIM REPORT 3 (1976).
The committee's report quoted at length from the analysis of Cockerham in McKnight, Family
Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 90-91 (1976).
221. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22 (Vernon 1975). No specific language for revision of § 5.22




sole management of community property would not give way to an interpreta-
tion of joint management by too much judicial reliance on subsection (c)
rather than subsection (a).
In the course of a divorce proceeding the wife filed a voluntary petition in
bankruptcy.2 22 The bankruptcy receiver took possession of property which
the husband claimed in another suit as community property subject to his sole
management. Since the wife died in the meantime, the administrator of her
estate also sought the property, and a judgment creditor of the wife inter-
vened to foreclose a lien on property in the receiver's possession. It was
concluded that all these matters were exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
probate court.
223
In O'Neill v. Mack Trucks, Inc. 224 a husband executed a note to a lender and
as security conveyed four acres of land by deed of trust. When the lender
sought to foreclose the deed of trust lien the grantor of the property asserted
his ownership of it as a business homestead. The four acres were within the
town in which the debtor lived. The creditor argued that because the debtor
had designated his residence as a homestead for purposes of receiving a tax
exemption, but had not so designated his business property, the debtor's past
acts indicated that he did not regard this property as a business homestead.
The court rejected this argument as irrelevant because designation for a tax
exemption applies only to residential homesteads. 225 The court went on to
point out that if the creditor seeks to reach a part of the debtor's interest in
homestead property because its value exceeded the allowable exemption at
the time of designation, the creditor must put the value of the property in
issue.226
A 1976 bankruptcy case 227 applied the rule in Hoffman v. Love28 that when
a homestead is established on land worth more than the maximum exemption
allowable and the value of that land continues to increase, then the exempt
portion of the homestead remains the same fraction of the total value as the
exemption was at the time of designation, increased proportionately with the
total increase in value. The bankrupts purchased their home in 1969 when the
value of the lot, exclusive of $120,000 in improvements, was valued at
$20,000, and the homestead exemption was $5,000. The value of the lot had
grown to $25,000 by 1976. Hence, the homestead exemption was in the ratio
222. Parr v. White, 543 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ).
223. Id. at 444.
224. 542 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. 1976).
225. The Texas attorney general expressed the opinions that TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
7150h (Vernon Supp. 1976-77) constitutes a constitutional grant of property tax exemption to
disabled veterans and their survivors, TEX. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-857 (1976), and applies to the
survivors of veterans who died before the passage of the act as well as those who died thereafter.
Id. H-894. See McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 86 (1974),
for comments on earlier legislation in this field.
226. The court also notes Dean McSwain's suggestion that in disputes such as these the value
limitation be applied first to the residential homestead. McSwain, The Texas Business Home-
stead, 15 BAYLOR L. REV. 39, 53 (1963). It is submitted, however, that unless the creditor seeks to
reach the residential homestead as well as the business homestead, the debtor may assert the
whole of exempt value as that of to the business homestead just as a debtor may assert the full
exempt value of personalty in favor of any particular piece of personalty a creditor may attempt
to seize. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3836(a) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
227. In re Bobbitt, No. BK-3-74-373-F (N.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 1976).
228. 494 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 499 S.W.2d 295
(Tex. 1973).
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of five to twenty, 229 leaving $18,750 of the present value non-exempt, and a
purchase money lien on the property in excess of that amount. The court held
the non-exempt portion was covered by the mortgage lien and, hence, no part
of the property was available to satisfy the obligations owing the unsecured
creditors .230
A subcontractor who seeks to establish a homeowner's liability for his
expenditures of labor and materials must be cautious to comply with the
statutory requirements for fixing liability in those regards. In Donahue v.
Rattikin Title Co. 23' the husband and wife contracted with a builder to
construct a home for them. The full contract price was placed in escrow and
the couple failed to retain ten percent, as required by article 5469,232 to protect
the builder's subcontractors who might have acquired lien status even against
homestead property by compliance with the provisions for notice and filing
under article 5453.233 The couple had agreed with the escrow agent that the
agent should pay lien creditors for amounts owed. Although these subcon-
tractors had not acquired liens, the escrow agent paid them from the couple's
funds. In an action against the agent for misapplication of funds, the husband
and wife were successful because the agent could not establish that the
indebtedness at issue was an obligation enforcible against the couple.
234
229. It was concluded in Valley Bank v. Skeen, 401 F. Supp. 139 (N.D. Tex. 1975), discussed
in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 94-95 (1976), that this
ratio is unaffected by the subsequent increase of the homestead exemption from $5,000 to
$10,000 in late 1970.
230. Kerens Nat'l Bank v. Stockton, 127 Tex. 326, 94 S.W.2d 161 (1936).
231. 534 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ).
232. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5469 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
233. Id. art. 5453.
234. Donahue v. Rattikin Title Co., 534 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no
writ).
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